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DUE PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL IN
SCHOOLS AND PRISONS
ELISABETH T. DREYFUSS* AND JANE C. KNAPP**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LAST BASTIONS OF AUTHORITARIANISM to have held out against
due process protection for their populations have been prisons and
schools, both shielded by convincing arguments of institutional con-
siderations of order, efficiency, and security. During the 1960s and
1970s, the court system has criticized these institutions and has imposed
upon them at least minimal constitutional standards of due process.'
Although institutional management always has been a legitimate con-
cern for schools and prisons,2 styles and methods of management remain
an appropriate area for further examination. Development in the areas
of fact-finding, rule-making and goal-setting is vital to the management
process if institutions are to answer to societal goals as defined by society
at large. This article will suggest that institutional goals for schools and
prisons must include educational components.
One goal of education in a democratic society is to enable an in-
dividual to find personal fulfillment through the cooperative making of
rules and setting of goals in those institutions within which he must
function. Indeed the structure of such rule-governed institutions is in
reality a microcosm' of the larger rule-oriented society which currently
exists in America. The health of that society will to some extent be
predicated upon the degree to which its citizens can fashion rules as a
technique of conflict avoidance or of ongoing conflict resolution.
* Adjunct Associate Professor of Law and Director of Street Law Program,
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A., Allegheny
College; M.A. Case-Western Reserve Univ.; J.D., Cleveland State Univ.,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
** B.A., Case Western Reserve Univ.; M. Ed., Akron Univ.; J.D., Cleveland
State Univ., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
The authors wish to thank Judith Zimmer for her research in the due process
area and her assistance in gathering rule manuals from jail/prisons and schools.
Also thanks goes to Judith Koziol for her help in preparing the manuscript.
' See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (prisons); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975) (schools); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisons); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (parole revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) (prisons); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(schools); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile law).
' See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
o Hansen, Rights, Responsibilities and Curriculum, 31 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 659
(1974).
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By their very nature, schools and prisons become societies unto
themselves. Rules are created to impose order for the participants of
the sub-society, and constant investigation is needed to determine who
is designing the structure and whose interests are being protected
and/or violated by that structure. Although this structure may appear
orderly to an outsider or a person holding a vested authority interest
within it, without shared decision-making the order may be a mere
facade where irreparable injury to the democratic ideal of peoples' con-
trol over the events of their lives may occur.4 Without the opportunity
to exercise such control by shared decision-making and rule-making
power, learning to responsibly exercise such control cannot occur.
The examples of repressive authoritarianism may result in a passivity
and acceptance of powerlessness that preclude responsible participation
in the larger society at a later date, a goal ostensibly of both schools'
and prisons.6 Because democracy cannot be suspended, standards by
which an individual can perceive his position vis-i-vis others must be
continually developed. The risk of not providing for such cognizance of
standards is a perception that "might makes right" or that physical or
psychological strength, regardless of its justification, are the paramount
wa7,s to effectuate institutional goals.7
An alternative to a potentially destructive rule-oriented institution is
an institution that explores and acts upon questions of control. Who is to
control the goal-setting process? How does rule-making reflect these
goals? Is there a relationship between goal formation and rule im-
plementation? Is fact-finding the crucial mechanism for effective rule
implementation? Issues like these must be addressed by both the
' Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in substance sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
' In schools, repressive authoritarianism can surface in the corporal punish-
ment area. One child psychologist has explored the reactions of children to such
authoritarianism:
Two extreme reactions can result when children are spanked regularly
and hard .... [o]ne child might simply collapse. His ego- his feeling of
being worthwhile- just goes down the drain. He begins to accept the
idea that he is evil and that he deserves punishment.
The other extreme reaction is violent resentment. If a child has a
strong ego, he often responds with an "I'll-get-you-yet" attitude. It's like
a playground game except that his response is directed at authority
figures not playmates.
At its worst, the violent response is an early sign of the child who
might one day become a criminal. At its best-which isn't very good-it
is simply a sign of the ultimately resentful adult.
Ramella, The Anatomy of Discipline: Should Punishment Be Corporal?, 67 P.T.A.
MAGAZINE 24, 26 (1973).
' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).




managerial hierarchy and the population of the institution. The process
becomes the management tool. The process, as a salutary episode in the
life of the institution, creates the environment in which mutual trust,
cooperation, and education can and will flourish.
The litmus paper for the process is fairness, which finds its best ex-
pression in the ongoing American efforts to define due process.8 Due
process, in an institutional setting, focuses essentially on what the rules
are, who creates them, and how they are implemented.' Organizing one's
day-to-day life in such a setting requires the prediction of results of
given behaviors, the setting of realistic goals, and the exertion of
reasonable control over events. Disruptions of these predictable
routines may result in conflict. Resolution of such conflicts depends
upon well-honed skills of early and accurate fact-finding. Only through
insightful fact-finding can the fundamental fairness which is due process
be preserved and acted upon at the lowest levels, tie., initial confronta-
tion. Courts tend to examine due process as it occurs in later stages of
institutional interactions," while the earlier stages escape due process
scrutiny. If unfairness exists at this rudimentary level, no degree of
later fairness can repair the injury. Skill in fact-finding provides the
remedy, a skill which can be learned and is perhaps the most essential
ingredient of a modern, humanistic society. It is the key to harmony
within the institution and the minimal guarantee owed by the institu-
tion to its population.'
8 Chief Justice Warren expressed the continuing nature of the definitional
process as follows:
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual con-
texts .... Therefore, as a generalization, it can be said that due process
embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have
become associated with differing types of proceedings. Whether the
Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific pro-
ceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on
that proceeding .... are all considerations which must be taken into ac-
count.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
' See, e.g., the rule manuals discussed in the text accompanying notes 68-84
infra. See also appendices I and II infra.
, See cases cited in note 2 supra.
I, Even judges such as Chief Judge Wyzanski of the United States District
Court of Massachusetts, who have resisted the expansion of due process protec-
tions where prisoners are involved, nevertheless expect that fairness must be
present in the actions of authority figures. As Judge Wyzanski observed: "Only
where those who exercise authority over him have acted arbitrarily, without any
plausible relation to considerations of fairness, or security, or legitimate order, or
rational discipline, has he a constitutional right to have their authority subjected
to judicial control." Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated
and remanded with directions, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
1979]
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The process of rule-making and fact-finding so crucial to implement-
ing rules is in itself both educational and workable. Skills in this area
can include language development, identification of interests (one's own,
others' and society's), citizenship skills (in terms of setting goals and
working toward those goals), problem-solving techniques (including the
ability to live with a certain inevitable degree of ambiguity), and in-
terpersonal relations skills where cooperation can replace confrontation.
Once these skills have been learned and used effectively, they form
the basis of a habit which is translatable into other human interactions
outside the institution. Conversely, if situations are met with inar-
ticulate brute force, there is a loss of this potential for controlling
events and the development of the habit of a violent response. 2 Even
force becomes justifiable since the student or inmate affected perceives
no fundamental fairness which might prohibit his acts. The emergence
of rules from given fact situations creates precedents for governing
similar situations in the future. Regularity of response leads to other
aspects of due process; rules can be written down, notice can be given,
procedural protections can be provided. Again, educational experience
will become legislative experience through active participation in rule-
making.
Society faces many issues which relate to its rule-oriented nature.
Courts have adopted a quasi-legislative posture, especially in areas such
as school desegregation."3 Institutions are exploring the costs of rules in
terms of financial outlays and administrative use of time. The process
begun by the "due process revolution"'" of the 1960s and 1970s has
" See note 5 supra. Circuit Judge Sobeloff warns of the potential for riot as
such a violent response; see note 128 supra.
13 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
" This term seems to have been coined by Erwin N. Griswold in reference to
the confrontation and cross-examination clauses of the Constitution. Writing in
1971, Mr. Griswold describes the "due process revolution" as follows:
Our law has changed a good deal in recent decades .... Yet it can be
said, I think, that there has been a constitutional revolution in the past
twenty years-or at least that we are in the midst of a constitutional
revolution. It can also be said, I think, that the results have often been
good-depending, of course, on one's standards of goodness in such mat-
ters. It is hard to articulate the intellectual bases for this revolution.
Like the Court's power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, it
may rest, in the last analysis, largely on fiat. From this it may follow
that the revolution will always be in process, subject to qualification and
reevaluation in changing times and circumstances. The heart of the
revolution is found in the fourteenth amendment, a rather general provi-
sion whose historical origin is well known.





reached the point of guaranteeing students and inmates fair procedures
and protections from arbitrary and capricious acts of officials. 5
This article will explore due process as an effective tool for the
management of schools and prisons through a close scrutiny of the four-
teenth amendment." The authors will attempt to identify emerging
trends in case law 7 and give special attention to Bell v. Wolfish, 8 which
may point to a new direction in due process analysis under the Burger
Court.
The purpose of this article is to propose radical reform of schools and
prisons through the involvement of their populations and staffs in the
rule-making process. Spawned by a firm belief that only through such
democratic processes can the violence and brutality which frequently
exist in both schools and prisons be effectively eradicated, the analysis
entails an examination of a representative sampling of models which
may hold promise for reform. 9
II. STATE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS AND PRISONS
Recently the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has
received careful analysis, with particular emphasis on whether the in-
terest involved is within the contemplation of the liberty or property
language of the amendment. To date, this protection has taken the
" As one observer stated:
The purpose of these due process extensions has been to require some
degree of rule-oriented or rule-governed behavior of public officials. At
the extreme, the opposite of rule-governed behavior is the province of
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable behavior on the part of public of-
ficials. Of course, that extreme is by no means inevitable. Between the
two extremes -specification of rules and procedures for all seasons on
the one hand, and uncontrolled caprice on the other, is the domain of ad-
ministrative discretion, wherein public officials have been given man-
dates of varying generality and then are expected to exercise their best
judgment in carrying them out. Where definitive rules do not exist,
discretion may either serve or stifle policy mandates. But when arbitrary
and capricious behavior is the result, it forms the occasion for judicial in-
tervention so that discretion can be controlled or channeled from unwar-
ranted uses. A simple review of the facts of cases applying due process
to novel areas provides a compendium of arbitrary and capricious
behavior that has largely compelled judicial intervention.
Jackson, The Little Red Schoolhouse Is No More: Due Process Comes to Public
Education, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 327 (1977) (emphasis in original).
See Part II infra.
'" See Part III infra.
'8 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
'9 See Part IV(B) infra, especially materials cited in notes 145-164 infra.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This focus indicates a shift from
previous analysis which centered on the right-privilege distinction. In Graham v.
19791
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form of procedural safeguards, largely in the setting of a hearing.2
As Chief Justice Burger has noted, "due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands....
Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some pro-
cess is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for pro-
cedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."22 The result of
this focus has been a series of cases examining the protections to be af-
forded a student or inmate in the school or prison setting.23 At this level,
the requirements are clear and highly developed; Goss v. Lopez" and
Wolff v. McDonnell25 illustrate what these requirements are. The need
remains, however, for greater development of due process which
reaches earlier stages in the confrontation between authority and the
population subject to such authority. The language of these cases man-
dates the extension of a fairness standard to earlier stages. This section
features an analysis of procedural due process essential to the hearing
stage and also involves substantive due process issues relating to the in-
herent fairness of rules."
A. Schools-Goss v. Lopez
Goss v. Lopez,27 which is essentially a procedural due process case, ex-
amined the protections needed for students who are to be suspended
from school. The Court's analysis began with an identification and balan-
cing of the interests involved. Although the Court did not find a con-
stitutional right to an education,8 it did find that the children had a
property interest in attending school' and a liberty interest in their
good names, free of the onus of school suspension." Since these interests
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Justice Blackmun pointed out: "This Court now
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern-
mental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."' Id. at 374.
21 In the school context, the hearing focused on has been the suspension hear-
ing as mandated by Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See text accompanying
notes 27-37 infra. In the prison context, it is the disciplinary hearing as set forth
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), which has received the Court's atten-
tion. See text accompanying notes 38-56 infra.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971).
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
21 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
21 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
' Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (seminal case defining concept
of substantive due process).
" 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
29 The Court explicitly stated: "[Ajmong other things, the State is constrained
to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause." 419 U.S. at 574.




were not to be regarded as de minimis, they were deserving of due pro-
cess protection."
After the protectable interests were identified, the Court determined
which procedural protections were required. In keeping with the flex-
ibility existing in the due process clause," procedures which were
responsive to the special demands of a school environment were
established.33 Using a balancing test, the Court determined that school
authorities did not have to be "totally free from notice and hearing re-
quirements if their schools [were] to operate with acceptable
efficiency. '34 The Goss Court established that a student faced with a
temporary suspension of ten days or less must "be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. The clause requires at least these rudimentary precau-
tions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary
exclusion from school."35
Although this case is addressed by the Court as one of procedural due
process, there is an underlying fairness standard discernible: "[W]e do
not believe that we have imposed procedures on school disciplinaries
which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead, we have imposed
requirements which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school prin-
cipal would inpose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.
' 36
It has been suggested that there are three purposes for the require-
ment of governmental due process: (1) to ensure that decision-makers
dignity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,' the minimal
requirements of the Clause must be satisfied." Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
Id. at 576.
32 See text accompanying note 3 supra. See also Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
419 U.S. at 580-84.
Id at 581.
3Id.
' Id at 583. In the twelve pages of the opinion which address the subject of
suspension procedures, the terms "fair" or "unfair" are used at least six times. In
addition to the example quoted above, see text accompanying note 35 supra. The
Court also stated:
The student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from
the educational process with all of its unfortunate consequences. The
Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly im-
posed, but it disserves both his interest and the interest of the State if
his suspension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be mostly
academic if the disciplinary process were a totally accurate, unerring
process, never mistaken and never unfair....
But it would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational in-
stitution if no communication was sought by the disciplinarian with the
student in an effort to inform him of his dereliction and to let him tell his
side of the story in order to make sure than an injustice is not done.
1979)
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are proceeding upon a correct determination of the underlying facts; (2)
to provide a basis for later judicial review of decisions; and (3) to
legitimize the actions of government by generating the feeling that just
procedures have been followed. 7 These purposes collectively provide
for a sense of legitimacy which is essential to a society predicated upon
trust and adherence to rules because they are fair. The same concerns
apply in microcosm in schools and prisons. This overall sense of
legitimacy is the guarantee that one will answer to society's rules
rather than to the whims or caprice of an individual, who, for however
short a time, may act beyond the mandate of that society. It is the fur-
ther guarantee that the rules themselves will be inherently fair.
B. Prisons-Wolff v. McDonnell
The clearest statement of procedural due process protections in
prison is Wolff v. McDonnell." Here the Supreme Court established
guidelines for disciplinary hearings resulting from infractions of prison
rules by inmates. The Court began by determining that it was the in-
mate's liberty interest which was deserving of due process protection,
even though the liberty involved was created by state statute.3 9
In determining which procedures were required, the Court examined
"'the precise nature of the government function involved as well as ...
the private interest that [had] been affected by governmental action."'40
A balancing of these interests was undertaken, with special deference
given to the uniqueness of the prison environment." The Court explored
"[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights .... " "Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking
and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No
better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and op-
portunity to meet it."
Id. at 579-80 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 170, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
' Dessem, Student Due Process Riq/its in Academic Dismissals From the
Public Schools, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 293 (1976).
3 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Factually, the case appeared before the Court because
prisoners in a Nebraska prison were subjected to a loss of good time credits or
confinement in a disciplinary cell if found guilty of serious misconduct within the
facility. Such loss of good time which affected the term of confinement and con-
finement in a disciplinary cell (affecting the conditions of confinement) were
found, by the Court, to be liberty interests. Their analysis focused on the pro-
cedure whereby serious misconduct was determined. Id. at 544-53.
Id. at 558.
40 Id. at 560 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971)).
41 The Court noted the following special circumstances which exist when a
prison disciplinary hearing takes place:
Prison disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, take place in a




its antecedent decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer 2 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli," ultimately refining the due process requirements to create
protections that were fine-tuned to the institutional disciplinary hear-
ing. The initial steps, paralleling those established in Morrissey and
Gagnon, require advance written notice of the claimed violation and a
written statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied upon and
the reasons for the disciplinary action taken." It also was noted that
"the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when per-
mitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety
or correctional goals. 4 5 This guarantee was not absolute in the face of
chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully in-
carcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are
recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent
means to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of
others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly
and reasonably safe prison life. Although there are very many varieties
of prisons with different degrees of security, we must realize that in
many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities con-
trolled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and in-
timate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration,
resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the in-
mates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code
that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.
418 U.S. at 561-62.
" 408 U.S. 471 (1972). This case addressed parole revocation and determined
that a revocation hearing must be conducted. Specific requirements were im-
posed: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of the evidence against him; (c) the opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing
body; and (f) a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.
43 411 U.S. 778 (1972). This case decided the question of whether due process
requires that an indigent probationer or parolee be represented by counsel at
revocation hearings. The Court decided that the state is not constitutionally
obliged to provide counsel in all cases but that it should do so where the indigent
probationer or parolee may have difficulty in presenting his version of disputed
facts without the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the presenta-
tion of complicated documentary evidence. Presumptively, counsel should be pro-
vided where, after being informed of his right, the probationer or parolee re-
quests counsel, based on a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed
the alleged violation or, if the violation is uncontested, that there are substantial
reasons in justification or mitigation that make revocation inappropriate. The
Court further required that in every case where a request for counsel is refused,
the grounds for refusal should be stated in the record. See Comment, The Right
to Counsel and Due Process In Probation Revocation Proceedings, Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 151 (1974).
" 418 U.S. at 564.
Id. at 566.
19791
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what the Court described as "the obvious potential for disruption""6 if
the inmate had the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison
population. Although not mandated, it was suggested that the finder of
fact "state its reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for ir-
relevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual
cases."47 The dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas evidenced his unwill-
ingness to concede such an important safeguard absent any special over-
riding considerations, 8 "[b]ecause most disciplinary cases will turn on
issues of fact."' 9 This seems to be an uncharacteristic truncation of this
highly-regarded right,"9 explainable only by the Court's extreme
deference to the institutional considerations existing in prisons.
The deference to institutional considerations appears again in the
right to counsel area where the Wolff Court refused "to hold that in-
mates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel in
46 Id
Id. It is interesting to compare this provision for confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses with the parallel provision in Morrisey in which the
Court held that the minimum requirements of due process included "the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1971). The presumption is different: under Morrissey,
the parolee is presumed to possess the right of confrontation and cross-
examination absent a specific finding of good cause for refusal by the hearing of-
ficer. In Wolff, on the other hand, the total discretion seems to lie in the hands of
the hearing committee, not even identifying a single accountable official or any
statement of the underlying reason. The sole justification for this is a fear that if
confrontation and cross-examination were allowed "there would be considerable
potential for havoc inside the prison walls." 418 U.S. at 567.
" 418 U.S. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621,
653 (1971)).
In his dissent, Justice Douglas expressed his feelings about the broad ap-
plicability of these rights in the following terms:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it
is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it
is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be per-
jurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, pre-
judice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the re-
quirements of confrontation and cross-examination .... This Court has
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not
only in criminal cases . .. but also in all types of cases where ad-
ministrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.





disciplinary proceedings."5' The institutional need established in the
right to counsel area is somewhat different from that seen in the
confrontation/cross-examination area. Internal order and security
outweigh individual rights in the latter area; as to the former, the Court
expressed a fear that "[tihe insertion of counsel into the disciplinary
process would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast
and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional
goals."5 The illiterate inmate, who is by no means a small proportion of
the general population of such institutions, was singled out for greater
protection in this area. Additionally, those inmates facing disciplinary
action arising from issues so complex that they were unlikely to "be
able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate com-
prehension of the case" were afforded protection;53 the institution must
allow a fellow inmate to serve as counsel-substitute, and if no such aid is
available or permitted by institutional rules, the staff of the prison must
provide the help.
The final issue raised in Wolff concerned whether the committee
charged with deciding the hearings was impartial so as to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. Although it was a committee comprised en-
tirely of institutional staff, the Court found that the committee's man-
dates precluded unlimited discretion.54 Hence, the Court concluded that
the committee did not present "such a hazard of arbitrary decisionmak-
ing that it should be held violative of due process of law." 5 It is worthy
of note that the Court considered unlimited discretion and arbitrariness
as threats to due process which must be guarded against.
51 418 U.S. at 570.
52 Id
Id. The protection of illiterate prisoners must be viewed as advisory,
however, since the plaintiff was not within the class of illiterate inmates.
5 The Court found that the committee could not be totally discretionary or
arbitrary because each member must reach his decision in conformity with con-
trolling regulations of the institution: the need to consider the causes of adverse
behavior; the need to take into account the setting and circumstances in which
the behavior occurred; the need to assess the man's accountability; and finally,
the need to adjust his decision to accord with correctional treatment goals. Id at
571.
The Court in examining the controlling regulations of the Nebraska prison
found that they contained the direction that "disciplinary measures will be taken
only at such times and to such degrees as are necessary to regulate and control a
man's behavior within acceptable limits and will never be rendered capriciously
or in the nature of retaliation or revenge." Because of the amount of internal pro-
tection against arbitrary and capricious action, the Court found it unnecessary to
impose external controls either by changing the composition of the committee or
by providing for external review of the committee's decisions. Id
55 Id
Examples of the Court's concern in regard to arbitrary acts are sprinkled
throughout the opinion, such as its statements that "[tihe touchstone of due pro-
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government," id at
1979]
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The partially dissenting opinions of Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Douglas expressed concerns that Wolff did not go far enough in ar-
ticulating due process protections to avoid those things which the Court
found prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, ie., arbitrary,
capricious, unfair acts by those in authority." Although sharing the fear
of the majority that arbitrariness was the evil to be avoided, the
dissenters found that minimum due process had been clearly defined in
Morrissey v. Brewer58 and that the procedures allowed by the majority
in Wolff were inadequate safeguards. The dissenters argue for full pro-
tection.59
In addition to noting that the Constitution follows the prisoner into
the institution," the dissenters also expressed concern for the
558 (quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)) and, in requiring
written records, "[a] written record helps to insure that administrators, faced
with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the
courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act
fairly." Id. at 565. See also note 38 supra and accompanying text.
11 418 U.S. at 580 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). See note 42 supra.
Justice Marshall stated:
My disagreement with the majority is over its disposition of the
primary issue presented by this case, the extent of the procedural pro-
tections required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in prisons disciplinary proceedings....
I see no justification for the Court's refusal to extend to prisoners
these procedural safeguards which in every other context we have found
to be among the "minimum requirements of due process."
418 U.S. at 580, 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (emphasis added by Mar-
shall, J.). Justice Douglas opined: "In my view, however, the threat of any
substantial deprivation of liberty within the prison confines, such as solitary con-
finement, is a loss which can be imposed upon respondent prisoner and his class
only after a full hearing with all due process safeguards." Id. at 594 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
I The majority expressed its belief in this proposition, stating: "But though
his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional en-
vironment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of consitutional protections when he
is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution
and the prisons of this country." Id. at 555-56. Marshall expressed his agreement
with this view, saying: "A prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights
at the prison gate, and I fully support the Court's holding that the interest of in-
mates in freedom from imposition of serious discipline is a 'liberty' entitled to
due process protection." Id at 580-81 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Justice Douglas also shared this belief: "Conviction of a crime does
not render one a nonperson whose rights are subject to the whim of the prison
administration, and therefore the imposition of any serious punishment within
the prison system requires procedural safeguards." Id. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissent-




rehabilitative goals of prisons within a democratic society.6 ' This look at
rehabilitation envisioned a prison environment where strong protec-
tions against arbitrariness exist. Justices Marshall and Brennan regarded
this as pertinent to intra-institutional harmony 2 while Justice Douglas
regarded it as pertinent to the re-entry of inmates into society at
large. 3 The dissenters vigorously contended that the Court had defer-
" Although the majority never expressly acknowledged rehabilitation as an
institutional goal, it did acknowledge that that view has been presented to them
and is worthy of consideration by them.
Indeed, it is pressed upon us that the proceedings to ascertain and
sanction misconduct themselves play a major role in furthering the in-
stitutional goal of modifying the behavior and value systems of prison in-
mates sufficiently to permit them to live within the law when they are
released. Inevitably there is a great range of personality and character
among those who have transgressed the criminal law. Some are more
amenable to suggestion and persuasion than others. Some may be incor-
rigible and would merely disrupt and exploit the disciplinary process for
their own ends. With some, rehabilitation may be best achieved by
simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible extent;
but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure. In
any event, it is argued, there would be great unwisdom in encasing the
disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional straitjacket that
would necessarily call for adversary proceedings typical of the criminal
trial, very likely raise the level of confrontation between staff and in-
mate, and make more difficult the utilization of the disciplinary process
as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution. This con-
sideration, along with the necessity to maintain an acceptable level of
personal security in the institution, must be taken into account as we
now examine in more detail the Nebraska procedures that the Court of
Appeals found wanting.
Id at 562-63. Indeed, it would seem fair to conclude that the Court has adopted
such a view since, in refusing to require confrontation and cross-examination, it
does so in order to support the "desire and effort of many States . . .and the
Federal Government to avoid situations that may trigger deep emotions and that
may scuttle the disciplinary process as a rehabilitative vehicle." Id at 568.
62 Justice Marshall's remarks, while specifically addressed to the confronta-
tion/cross-examination issue, reflect his underlying philosophy in the following
language:
Moreover, by far the greater weight of correctional authority is that
greater procedural fairness in disciplinary proceedings, including per-
mitting confrontation and cross-examination, would enhance rather than
impair the disciplinary process as a rehabilitative tool. "Time has proved
... that blind deference to correctional officials does no real service to
them. Judicial concern with procedural regularity has a direct bearing
upon the maintenance of institutional order; the orderly care with which
decisions are made by the prison authority is intimately related to the
level of respect with which prisoners regard that authority. There is
nothing more corrosive to the fabric of a public institution such as a
prison than a feeling among those whom it contains that they are being
treated unfairly."
As The Chief Justice noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, "fair treatment
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red to the discretion of prison officials to the point where inmates'
rights are practically unenforceable."
Although the discussion in Wolff concerned a procedure which is
severely truncated (a point of concern to scholars in this field)"5 and a
procedure which may leave questions as to whether an inmate has any
meaningful protection against mistaken fact-finding in the absence of
the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel, there have
been positive benefits from the decision. Institutions now function
... will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to ar-
bitrariness."
Id at 588-89 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing, inter
alia, Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1283 (1st Cir. 1973)).
Justice Douglas revealed his philosophy in the following language in the
context of confrontation/cross-examination:
Likewise the prisoner should have the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses who testify at the hearing. Opposed is the view that the right
may somehow undermine the proper administration of the prison,
especially if accused inmates are allowed to put questions to their
guards. That, however, is a view of prison administration which is out-
moded and indeed anti-rehabilitative, for it supports the prevailing pat-
tern of hostility between inmate and personnel which generates an "in-
mates' code" of non-cooperation, thereby preventing the rapport
necessary for a successful rehabilitative program. The goal is to
reintegrate inmates into a society where men are supposed to be treated
fairly by the government, not arbitrarily.
Id. at 596-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
, Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 598
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
Justice Douglas moved from the purely procedural aspects of due process into
a concern for substantive due process:
A report prepared for the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower
and Training has pointed out that the "basic hurdle [to reintegration] is
the concept of a prisoner as a nonperson and the jailer as an absolute
monarch. The legal strategy to surmount this hurdle is to adopt rules...
maximizing the prisoner's freedom, dignity, and responsibility. More
particularly, the law must respond to the substantive and procedural
claims that prisoners may have .. " We recognized this truth in Mor-
rissey, where we noted that society has an interest in treating the
parolee fairly in part because "fair treatment in parole revocations will
enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to ar-
bitrariness." The same principle applies to inmates as well.
Id at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part)
(citing, inter alia, F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS 65 (1965)).
E.g., Special Project, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry Into the
Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REV. 919 (1974); Note, The Four-
teenth Amendment and Prisons: A New Look at Due Process for Prisoners, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (1975); Note, The Process Due Prisoners, 54 NEB. L. REV. 724
(1975); Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings-The
Supreme Court Responds, 53 N.C.L. REV. 793 (1975); Note, Backwash Benefits for
Second Class Citizens: Prisoners'First Amendment and Procedural Due Process




under written rules"6 which provide information and accountability for
both staff and population. This response is an effort to aid in reaching
the rehabilitative goals of such institutions.
C. Effects On Administration Of Institutions
In the wake of Goss and Wolff, institutions have moved to a new level
of governance. Through the adoption of written rules and the cor-
relative responsibility to make those available to students and inmates
in a meaningful way,"7 schools and prisons have guarded against ar-
An empirical study undertaken by the staff of the Georgia Law Review at
three of Georgia's correctional institutions explored inmates' knowledge of the
rules. After compiling data, the staff observed:
The conclusion to be drawn from the disparity between what the in-
mates know and what they think they know is inescapable: the written
rules do not always form the true basis for prison discipline. The rules
around which the prison discipline system seems to function are not
necessarily the written rules at all, but are rather whatever an officer
says they are. The inmates can certainly understand such information,
and this notion tends to explain why the inmates say they understand
the rules.
Special Project, supra note 65, at 955.
" A good example of the rule writing which has occurred since 1975 is found
in the Uniform Code of Student Conduct of the Detroit Public Schools. In its in-
troduction, it provides for promulgation and dissemination:
The United States Supreme Court has held that a student may not be
deprived of this right to a public education without adherence to pro-
cedural due process. It is the responsibility of the Detroit Board of
Education and its staff to ensure that no student is arbitrarily denied
the right to an education. It is the responsibility of each student to
behave in a manner that does not threaten, interfere with or deprive
other students of their right to an education.
The purposes of this conduct code are to provide regulations govern-
ing the behavior of students, to prevent actions or activities interfering
with the school program and/or prohibited by law, and to provide for
students' rights and responsibilities. Each staff member employed by
the School District of the City of Detroit is required to function in accord-
ance with this code. This code shall be mandatory and enforced uniformly
in each Detroit public school. Individual schools may adopt additional
regulations governing actions not covered by the code, but such addi-
tional regulations may neither substitute for nor negate any of these
provisions.
It is the responsibility of all students and their parents to become
familiar with the Student Code. Students must recognize that when they
engage in unacceptable conduct they will be subject to disciplinary ac-
tion.
UNIFORM CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 1 (4th ed. 1978-79) (Board of Education of
the City of Detroit).
An example in the prison context is found in Rule 6 of the Code of Regula-
tions of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services:
Advisement of Disciplinary Procedures. It shall be the duty of the Chief
Executive Officer to advise in writing those adult offenders admitted to
the facility of the Department's disciplinary procedure. Such information
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bitrary and capricious governance and have become rule-governed in-
stitutions where discretion is limited. This step has been a significant
one for these institutions, and the authors' thesis is that the next step
must be toward their becoming rule-making societies.
School boards and courts, pursuant to their supervisory powers, have
largely been responsible for rules and regulations that presently govern
schools and prisons. Their products have been manuals of rules designed
for distribution to students and inmates. Some communities, in consider-
ing literacy problems, have designed rule manuals capable of being easily
read and have translated them for the non-English speaking.
In looking at these institutions' rules, 8 the focus will be upon the pro-
tections that have been formed around the hearing stage. These protec-
tions have emerged directly from Goss and Wolff, often tracking the
language of the opinions. The most common applications of due process
surface in the creation of impartial hearing boards or officers, provision
for investigation of facts, and better documentation and notice
throughout the process.
Under Goss v. Lopez,69 all schools are required to provide a hearing
prior to suspending a student from school for up to ten days. At a
minimum, some rule manuals simply state that "[nlo student will be
suspended or expelled without receiving written notice of the charges
and the opportunity to a hearing (admission or denial)."" Many schools
fit a middle pattern where the procedures are set forth more explicitly
in the manual. For instance:
Before a student may be suspended or expelled, the student
may be given either at the time of admission to the facility or during the
reception and orientation period. The dissemination of such information
may be in the form of printed manuals or pamphlets or any other form
which may be either kept on the adult offender or among personal
belongings for ready reference.
CODE OF REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES OF THE
STATE OF NEBRASKA, R. 6 Adult Offender Discipline 6-1 (Department of Correc-
tional Services, Lincoln, Nebraska) [hereinafter cited as NEBRASKA RULES].
" To examine the impact of Goss and Wolff on assorted institutions, the
authors of this article selected representative institutions and requested copies
of their rules and procedures. Schools which responded to this request include:
Berea City School District, Berea, Ohio; Cleveland Heights-University Heights
City School District, Cleveland, Ohio; Cleveland Public Schools, Cleveland, Ohio;
Detroit Public Schools, Detroit, Michigan; Lakewood High School, Lakewood,
Ohio; Mayfield High School, Cleveland, Ohio; Parma City School District, Parma,
Ohio; Shaker Heights City School District, Shaker Heights, Ohio; Shaw High
School, East Cleveland, Ohio; South Euclid-Lyndhurst City Schools, Cleveland,
Ohio. Jails/prisons which responded to this request include: Cuyahoga County
Correctional Facility, Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Department of Correctional Ser-
vices, Lincoln, Nebraska; Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Col-
umbus, Ohio; Trumbull County Sheriffs Department, Warren, Ohio.
69 419 U.S. 565 (1975).





must be: Given written notice of the intention to suspend or ex-
pel and the reasons for this action.... In the case of suspension,
provided with an informal hearing; at this hearing the student
may challenge the reasons for the intended suspension or other-
wise explain his/her actions. This hearing may be conducted by
the superintendent, his/her designee, the principal or assistant
principal....
Decisions rendered in suspension/expulsion hearings may be
appealed.7"
The highest level of detailed rule writing (often accompanied by a
higher level of due process protection) seems to be present in school
districts which are subject to court-ordered desegregation plans. Here,
the courts have gone beyond Goss and have provided greater
safeguards because of equal protection concerns."
"' POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF BEHAVIOR AND DISCIPLINE GOVERNING
STUDENTS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (August 14, 1979) (Shaker Heights, Ohio,
Board of Education).
72 In Detroit, the rule manual provides:
Before being excluded, suspended or recommended for expulsion
students... will be given a "hearing" before the principal (or person act-
ing as principal). The principal . . . will inform the student orally or in
writing of the charges against him (her), including the basis (evidence)
for such charges. If the student denies the charges, he (she) will be given
the opportunity to give his (her) version of the events relating to the
charge....
Suspension Hearing-In addition to written notice (certified letter) to
the parents of the time of the hearing and charges to be made against
the student, the following will be adhered to in all suspension hearings:
(a) At the hearing the student and his (her) parents or legal guardian
will have the opportunity to present his (her) side of the case and to
question witnesses. Parents or guardians may be represented by an ad-
visor of their choice who may or may not be an attorney. Parental
authorization for the advisor to appear on behalf of the student must be
on file in writing with the principal at or before the time of the suspen-
sion hearing. No suspension hearing will be held unless and until it is at-
tended by the parent or legal guardian of the student. (This requirement
may be waived by the principal in the event of extenuating cir-
cumstances or if the student has reached his eighteenth birthday.)
(b) The staff person(s) making the charges pertinent to the suspension
must be present at the suspension hearing and be available for ques-
tioning by the parents, legal guardian or representative. In the event
that the person making the charges is the principal, another ad-
ministrator assigned by the Region Office will hear the charges and
otherwise fill the role of the principal (or person acting as principal) with
regard to the suspension hearing process.
(c) Within one school day of the hearing, the principal (or person act-
ing as principal) or other administrator will communicate with the
parents and/or student by certified letter advising them:
1. His decision as to whether the student engaged in the behavior as
charged.
2. What the discipline will be (if the charge was sustained).
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The same general pattern can be found in prison rule books, whose
origins date from the seminal decision Wolff v. McDonnell.71 Again, the
further removed one is from the federal court, the less refined are the
rules. An example of the minimal nature of some disciplinary pro-
cedures is that of the Trumbull County (Ohio) Jail Manual which states:
A violation of a jail rule or regulation when detected by the
sheriff or his designated officer, the sheriff shall cause the in-
mate who violated the rule or regulation to be separated from
all other inmates. A formal written report shall be prepared by
the officer who witnessed the infraction and who was responsi-
ble for the removal of the inmate from the other inmates and
submitted to the sheriff and/or his designated representative.
The sheriff shall review the report to determine (1) If a viola-
tion was committed (2) The seriousness of the offense (3)
Whether or not to return the inmate to the general jail popula-
tion and (4) The appropriate disciplinary action to take. The
violator in all cases shall be given the opportunity to defend
himself or herself in writing and/or orally before the sheriff
makes a final decision. 4
3. Of the right to appeal and the procedures provided in this code
for instituting such appeal.
UNIFORM CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 8-10 (4th ed. 1978-79) (Board of Education of
the City of Detroit). The Code goes on to establish procedures for appeal.
Students and parents who are dissatisfied with the outcome of a sus-
pension.., hearing have the right to appeal the decision to the Region
Superintendent by informing him (her) in writing that they wish to ap-
peal the principal's decision .... Upon receipt of the appeal, the Region
Superintendent will appoint a review panel consisting of two staff
members and one member of the community....
Exclusions, suspensions and expulsions upheld by the Regional Hear-
ing Panel may be reviewed by the Central Board if the student or his
parents or guardian request such a review in writing....
Id. at 10-11. The rules governing appeal provide the same procedural rights and
protections as are noted in the suspension hearing discussion.
13 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See Part II(B) supra.
11 RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TRUMBULL COUNTY,
OHIO, JAIL (July 7, 1977) (Trumbull County Sheriff's Department). It should be
noted in reviewing these procedures that they may fall short of the Wolff man-
date. In particular, there seems to be no specific provision for written notice of
the charges to the inmate, no guarantee of a hearing (since written response by
the inmate is permissible), and no provision exists for informing the inmate of the
evidence on which the charges are based. Further, even the truncated rights to
confrontation and cross-examination which Wolff allowed when it posed no undue
hazard to the institution do not exist in these procedures.
Although the procedures are foreshortened, the liberty deprivation is no less
than that in question in Wolff. Indeed, the manual itself points out that potential
disciplinary actions include confinement for a period not in excess of one week "in




At the other extreme, one finds court imposed procedures inspired
directly by Wolff. In Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the federal district court
developed a manual for jail operations in an inmate-instituted case,
Sykes v. Krieger."5 Prior to judgment the defendants agreed to a partial
consent decree which established the following procedures for
disciplinary hearings:
A charged inmate shall be informed in writing of the rule
broken and the facts on which the charge is based. This shall be
at least 24 hours before the hearing. He shall also be advised
orally of what his rights are in regards to the disciplinary hear-
ing....
A hearing shall be held within 36 hours of the time inmate is
placed into isolation, is locked in his cell, or has one of his
privileges withdrawn. However, this time limitation will be
suspended on weekends and holidays....
There shall be a summary written record of the proceedings
maintained by the Sheriffs Department.
The hearing officer shall be either the Warden or a shift
lieutenant, as long as he is not the charging officer, or a witness.
If he is the charging officer or a witness, someone of at least
equal rank shall preside.
The inmate has the right to testify and shall be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense
when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to
the institutional safety or orderly administration of the facility.
When there is a limitation placed on the inmate's testimony, or
on the witnesses he is allowed to call, the reasons shall be set
forth in writing in the record.
The hearing officer shall exercise control over the hearings,
and the evidence presented shall be subjected to reasonable
limits as to amount and relevance. He shall make his decision,
which shall be in writing, and based on the evidence taken, state
the reasons for the decision, and the punishment to be imposed.
The charging party shall have the burden of proving each ele-
ment of the charged offense."'
The district court in its final order made possible additional safeguards
in order to fully implement Wolffs due process standards:
The right of an accused inmate to confront and cross-examine
his accuser at disciplinary hearings is committed to the sound
discretion of jail officials administering such inquiries.
The right of accused inmates to legal counsel or counsel
" No. C71-1181 (N.D. Ohio, filed May 15, 1975).
" Id, Partial consent judgment at 2-3 (filed May 15, 1975).
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substitute at a disciplinary hearing are committed to the sound
discretion of jail officials administering such inquiries. ... 17
Interestingly, when the jail promulgated its rule manual, the provisions
regarding board punishment went even further than the court's order
and also beyond the Wolff requirements by necessitating a written
report of the reasons for denying the right to call witnesses and to pre-
sent documentary evidence. The rule mandates that "if a limitation is
placed on the inmate's right to call witnesses or present evidence, the
reasons therefore shall be stated in the Sheriff's log."78
In Nebraska, where Wolff arose, the Department of Correctional Ser-
vices has created a discipline procedure which encompasses more due
process protection than is required. In language permeated with the
fairness standard inherent in substantive due process, it provides a set
of guiding principles which include:
(3) Disciplinary Principles -In every disciplinary action taken
throughout the Department, the following principles shall be ap-
plicable.
(a) Disciplinary action is to be of such a nature as to regulate a
committed adult offender's behavior within acceptable limits,
and shall be taken at such times and in such degrees as is
necessary to accomplish this objective.
(b) The behavior of adult offenders committed to the custody
of the Department shall be controlled in a completely impartial
and consistent manner.
(c) Disciplinary action shall not be capricious, retaliatory or
revengeful.
(d) Corporal punishment of any kind is strictly prohibited.
(e) Detailed reports of all disciplinary actions shall be kept."9
Concern is shown for the impartiality of the hearing body as well as
rehabilitative concerns by the requirement that "a person representing
the treatment or counseling staff ... shall participate as a member of
the facility Disciplinary Committee""0 to the extent possible and that no
person should serve on the Committee during a hearing "if that member
has first hand knowledge of the charges brought against the accused
adult offender, either as an eye witness or as the reporting officer or in-
vestigating officer."" Written reasons are also required if the rights to
Id, slip op. at 21.
78 RULES FOR THE REGULATION OF THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY JAIL 7 (May, 1976)
(Cuyahoga County, Ohio) [hereinafter cited as CUYAHOGA COUNTY RULES].
NEBRASKA RULES, supra note 67, R. 6 Adult Offender Discipline 6-1.
o Id at 6-2.
81 Id The Cuyahoga County Rules contain a similar provision. CUYAHOGA




call witnesses or to present evidence are abridged."2 The assistance of
counsel or counsel substitute, generally extended to illiterate inmates,
is available under the Nebraska system to any inmate in order to better
prepare his/her defense. 3
With the advent of the written rule manual, some level of educational
benefit has accrued to these institutions. Since officials and population
are both held to a knowledge of and familiarity with the rules, there is
an informational commonality present. Beyond this, there is an expecta-
tion of participation on both sides of the authority line in fact-finding
and documentation. Students and inmates are no longer required to be
mere passive obeyers of orders but instead have the potential to be ac-
tive advocates of their version of events before an impartial fact-finder.
On the other side, the discretionary authority of the institutional staff is
curtailed by an obligation to operate fairly and consistently on the basis
of institutional rules. Within this relationship one can speak of participa-
tion of all concerned parties in the limited range of those disciplinary in-
fractions serious enough to trigger due process protections. The expan-
sion of this stage (toward participatory institutional governance) is the
subject of later discussion. 4
III. EMERGING TRENDS
Since the mid-1970s when Wolff v. McDonnell" and Goss v. Lopez"8
were decided, the United States Supreme Court has again addressed
both school and prison due process issues. Although presented with op-
portunities to further refine the due process protections established by
Wolff and Goss at pre-hearing stages, 7 the Court has refused to do so.
The trend of the late-1970s is a return to the "hands off' doctrine8 and a
82 NEBRASKA RULES, supra note 67, R. 6 Adult Offender Discipline 6-3. See
also text accompanying note 67 supra.
83 NEBRASKA RULES, supra note 67, R. 6 Adult Offender Discipline 6-3.
See Part IV infra.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
87 In the school setting, the Court has been presented with the corporal
punishment issue, a disciplinary measure considered less severe than suspension
and, therefore, not subject to the suspension hearing procedures. This case, In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), resulted in a refusal by the Court to im-
pose advance procedural safeguards prior to a paddling.
In the prison area, the Court has been presented with the issue of the ap-
plicability of the due process clause to pre-trial detainees. The Court did hold
that pre-trial detainees are covered by the due process clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 99
S. Ct. 1861 (1979). The Court failed to find, however, that the due process clause
reached so far as to invalidate a variety of restrictions imposed by a federally
operated short-term facility in New York upon pre-trial detainees.
' The term "hands-off' doctrine refers to the Court's historic reluctance to in-
terfere in the day-to-day administration of jails and prisons. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), represents the Court's rejection of this doctrine with imposi-
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heightened deference to institutional considerations rather than to in-
dividual interests of students or inmates. The "balancing test"89 applied
in Goss and Wolff, although not officially abandoned, seems to reflect a
shift in the weight accorded the institutional interest.
In Goss, Justice Powell expressed the concerns of the "Nixon Four"'"
that the "decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention
in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the
quality of education." Ie felt "[olne of the more disturbing aspects of
today's decision is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the
adversary process, as the means of resolving many of the most routine
problems arising in the classroom."93
The minority rejected the balancing of interests employed by the ma-
tion of rules protecting liberty interests of inmates. See generally Special Pro-ject, supra note 65, at 919-25; Note, Backwash Benefits for Second Class Citizens:
Prisoners' First Amendment and Procedural Due Process Rights, 46 U. COLO. L.
REV. 377, 378-83 (1975).
" The term "balancing test" indicates an approach used by the Court to
weigh society's interest in the functions of its institutions, ie., jail/prisons and
schools, and the interests of individuals who populate them.
" The split of the Court in Goss served as a harbinger of the emerging trend.
Although both the majority and the minority would seem to unite in their goal,
i e., providing better education,
it is in the means of achieving those ends that they differ. The "law and
order" side would seek to perpetuate the status quo, even regressing, in
order to bring to heel increased violence and crime in schools. Under
this rubric, retention of corporal punishment, compulsory attendance,
and states' rights are emphasized.
Opposed to this viewpoint of more repression are those who urge
more freedom and more participation by children and the ultimate
humanizing of the schools. Their view is that the Supreme Court was
right ... when it held that children are "persons" and are entitled to the
same right an adult would have in similar circumstances. The group is
interested in children more as ends than as means.
Nolte, Are Students "Persons" Under the Constitution?, 5 LAw AM. SocY 9
(1976).
"' These Justices are Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun,
and Justice Rehnquist. See Nolte, supra note 90, et 11.
92 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 585 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). He con-
tinued:
The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than
educational officials and state legislatures, have the authority to deter-
mine the rules applicable to routine classroom discipline of children and
teenagers in the public schools. It justifies this unprecedented intrusion
into the process of elementary and secondary education by identifying a
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to be suspended for
as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing either
before or promptly following the suspension.
Id.




jority, 4 believing precedent required a "hands off" approach." In addi-
tion, they failed to find divergent interests of the school and the student
to balance." This lack of divergent interests occurred because of the
terms in which the minority defined the state's interest and the
student's. Justice Powell stated that "[tihe State's interest, broadly put,
is in the proper functioning of its public school system for the benefit of
all pupils and the public generally. 97 He found suspension to be "one of
the traditional means . . . used to maintain discipline in the schools."98
Citing then-current statistics on suspensions,99 he concluded that to re-
quire hearings in a substantial percentage of the cases would bring the
educational process to a grinding halt. ' °1 The student's interest in educa-
' See text accompanying note 34 supra.
" Relying upon Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court stated:
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized that school
authorities must have broad discretionary authority in the daily opera-
tion of public schools. This includes wide latitude with respect to main-
taining discipline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, the
Court stated in [Tinker]: "[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature of public
education and the correspondingly limited role of the judiciary in its
supervision. In [Epperson] the Court stated: "By and large, public educa-
tion in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of con-
flicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do
not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."
The Court today turns its back on these precedents.
419 U.S. at 589-90 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
" "Unlike the divergent and even sharp conflict of interests usually present
where due process rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the
State through its schools and of the pupils-are essentially congruent." 419 U.S.
at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id, (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Justice Powell documents his observation as follows:
An amicus brief submitted by several school associations in Ohio in-
dicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 1972-1973, 4054
students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were suspended in Cincin-
nati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in Akron; and 14,598 of
142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland. See also the Office of
Civil Rights Survey . . . finding that approximately 20,000 students in
New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 9,000 in Houston, and 9,000 in Mem-
phis were suspended at least once during the 1972-1973 school year.
Even these figures are probably somewhat conservative since some
schools did not reply to the survey.
Id at 592 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
SId. at 592 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tion was defined as not incompatible with the state's. In fact, Justice
Powell defined education as "the inculcation of an understanding in each
pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto, [which] is no less
important than learning to read and write."'0 1 Consequently, the
freedom of the school to discipline and the necessity of the student to
succumb to such discipline are one and the same interest.
Justice Powell expressed deep concern about the parameters of the
majority decision.0 2 This fear has proven to be groundless since the
Goss minority has become a majority, expounding its views of quite
limited judicial intervention in schools as exemplified in the 1977 deci-
sion Ingraham v. Wright."3
In its most recent pronouncement in the prison area, Bell v.
Wolfish,'" the Court addressed several issues arising from a pretrial
detention facility operated by the federal government in New York City.
The focus of these issues was the conditions under which these de-
tainees were being confined.' 5 The Court upheld each of the conditions
considered after a due process analysis which, they claimed,0 ° derived
from the interest-balancing approach utilized in Wolff v. McDonnell. 7
Id at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102 Part III of Powell's dissent demonstrates his concern. At one point, he
states: "No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the Court
now enters. Today's ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in
education a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educational process." Id.
at 597 (Powell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he noted:
If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due process pro-
cedures whenever such routine school decisions are challenged, the im-
pact upon public education will be serious indeed. The discretion and
judgment of federal courts across the land often will be substituted for
that of the 50 state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards, and the
2,000,000 teachers who heretofore have been responsible for the ad-
ministration of the American public school system.
Id at 599 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). He concluded, "the federal
courts should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society." Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
103 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
"0 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
105 The pretrial detainees were challenging various practices and rules of the
Metropolitan Correctional Center. Included were the practice of housing two in-
mates in individual rooms originally intended for single occupancy (double-
bunking); a "publisher-only" rule which prohibited inmates from receiving hard
cover books not directly mailed from publishers, book clubs, or book stores; a pro-
hibition against inmates' receipt of packages of food and personal items from out-
side the institution; the practice of body-cavity searches of inmates following con-
tact visits; and the requirement that pretrial detainees remain outside their
rooms during routine inspections.
'" 99 S. Ct. at 1877-79.
107 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Court had no difficulty in finding that the same due





Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, attempted to balance the
interests of the institution with those of the inmates. In striking the
balance, he found that "maintaining institutional security and preserv-
ing internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require
limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both con-
victed prisoners and pretrial detainees."' 8 Because of this, he concluded
that "[pirison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security."101
The Court placed a limit on the amount of discretion that prison ad-
ministrators could exercise without depriving inmates of their liberty
without due process. The Court defined the proper inquiry as whether
the conditions imposed in the prison officials' discretion amount to
punishment of the detainee. ' The Court reminded prison ad-
ministrators of the test traditionally applied to determine whether an
act is punitive in nature:
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often
point in differing directions.""
In applying this test, Justice Rehnquist characterized the Court's task
as deciding
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment
or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate govern-
mental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to
punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determina-
tion generally will turn on "[w]hether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned [to it]. Thus, if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a
10 99 S. Ct. at 1878.
Id (emphasis added).
... Id at 1872.
.. d. at 1873 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
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legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to "punishment.'. 2
What emerged as a result of this "punishment" approach was an ap-
plication of the rational basis test, generally confined to equal protec-
tion analysis. The usual due process standard-the compelling state in-
terest test-which has always been used for cases like this,"3 has been
abandoned. The dissenters pointed this out in a manner best described
as outraged.
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, which opened with the remark
"[tjhis is not an equal protection case,"". pointed out that the liberty
deprivation involved was a fundamental right and that under the proper
due process standard analysis, the opposite conclusion would be
reached." 5 Justice Marshall also commented upon the improper analysis
of the majority:
In my view, the Court's holding departs from the precedent it
purports to follow and precludes effective judicial review of the
conditions of pretrial confinement. More fundamentally, I
believe the proper inquiry in this context is not whether a par-
ticular restraint can be labeled "punishment." Rather, as with
other due process challenges, the inquiry should be whether the
governmental interests served by any given restriction
outweigh the individual deprivations suffered. . . . Moreover,
even if the inquiry the Court pursues were more productive, it
simply is not the one the Constitution mandates here. By its
terms, the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of depriva-
tions, not on the persons inflicting them. If this concern is to be
vindicated, it is the effect of conditions of confinement, not the
intent behind them, that must be the focal point of constitutional
analysis."6
" Id. at 1873-74 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
"' E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
". 99 S. Ct. at 1895 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stevens continued:
An empirical judgment that most persons formally accused of criminal
conduct are probably guilty would provide a rational basis for a set of
rules that treat them like convicts until they establish their innocence.
No matter how rational such an approach might be-no matter how ac-
ceptable in a community where equality of status is the dominant goal-
it is obnoxious to the concept of individual freedom protected by the Due
Process Clause. If ever accepted in this country, it would work a fun-
damental change in the character of our free society.
Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 1899-903 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




Thus, despite the vigorous opposition of the three dissenters,' the ma-
jority in Wolfish left the inmates with less protection. The correctional
officials need only show that their acts or policies are rationally related
to institutional goals in order to prevail against an inmate's claim that
his fundamental rights have been violated while upon the inmate rests
the virtually insurmountable task of proving that the act or policy is
based upon a subjective intent to punish. As Justice Marshall has
observed in a slightly different context,"8 when one subjects challenged
legislation or acts to the rational basis test, the government always
wins. In like manner, it seems safe to predict that inmates will prevail
only in cases of outrageous abuse.
The majority carved out one exception to the subjective intent test
for restrictions or conditions which can be shown to be arbitrary or pur-
poseless. In such cases "a court permissibly may infer that the purpose
of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally
be. inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.""'
The trend which emerges in cases like Ingraham v. Wright"' and Bell
v. Wolfish"' is a return to the "hands off""'2 doctrine of the pre-Goss,
pre-Wolff era. This trend is clearly expressed throughout the majority
opinion in Wolfish. Justice Rehnquist, instructing courts to be mindful
that their roles in inquiries into the policies of running correction
"' Mr. Justice Marshall's vigor is apparent from his words:
The Court holds that the Government may burden pretrial detainees
with almost any restriction, provided detention officials do not proclaim
a punitive intent or impose conditions that are "arbitrary or pur-
poseless." As if this standard were not sufficiently ineffectual, the Court
dilutes it further by according virtually unlimited deference to detention
officials' justifications for particular impositions. Conspicuously lacking
from this analysis is any meaningful consideration of the most relevant
factor, the impact that restrictions may have on inmates. Such an ap-
proach is unsupportable given that all of these detainees are presump-
tively innocent and many are confined solely because they cannot afford
bail.
Id. at 1886-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stevens expressed his
anguish in these terms:
In short, a careful reading of the Court's opinion reveals that it has at-
tenuated the detainee's constitutional protection against punishment into
nothing more than a prohibition against irrational classifications or bar-
baric treatment. Having recognized in theory that the source of that pro-
tection is the Due Process Clause, the Court has in practice defined its
scope in the far more permissive terms of equal protection and Eighth
Amendment analysis.
Id at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,,8 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976).
99 S. Ct. at 1874.
120 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
12 99 S. Ct. at 1861.
" See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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facilities must "spring from constitutional requirements and that
judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea
of how best to operate a detention facility," grounds this return to
"hands off" in the traditional separation of powers analysis.'23 He
reiterates this forcefully in the concluding remarks of his opinion:
There was a time not too long ago when the federal judiciary
took a completely "hands off" approach to the problem of prison
administration. In recent years, however, these courts largely
have discarded this "hands off" attitude and have waded into
this complex arena. The deplorable condition and draconian
restrictions of some of our Nation's prisons are too well known
to require recounting here, and the federal courts rightly have
condemned these sordid aspects of our prison systems. But
many of these same courts have, in the name of the Constitution,
become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison opera-
tions. Judges, after all, are human. They, no less than others in
our society, have a natural tendency to believe that their in-
dividual solutions to often intractable problems are better and
more workable than those of the persons who are actually charged
with and trained in the running of the particular institution
under examination. But under the Constitution, the first ques-
tion to be answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch
of the Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the
plan. This does not mean that constitutional rights are not to be
scrupulously observed. It does mean, however, that the inquiry
of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the
issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of
the Constitution, or in the case of a federal prison, a statute. The
wide range of "judgement calls" that meet constitutional and
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the
Judicial Branch of Government.'24
If this return to court abstention is the current trend, then there is
little reason to expect a change in the foreseeable future. The composi-
tion of the Court indicates that the Wolfish majority will remain as the,
majority position. 115
" 99 S. Ct. at 1874. Justice Rehnquist explained why courts should give wide-
ranging deference to the institutional officials:
[J]udicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator or-
dinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp
of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the operation
of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative
and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial.
Id at 1879.
14 Id at 1886.
12 To compare the makeup of the Court as the major decisions discussed in




The imposition of written rules, as mandated by the school and prison
cases, may prompt developments within institutions that will be signifi-
cant in the future. Progress has been made in getting due process inside
the prison and schoolhouse gates. Now the institutions are challenged to
find innovative ways of resolving their internal conflicts in a manner
consistent with the underlying philosophy of the due process decisions.
Even if the courts retreat from active intervention, they leave in place
institutions which are responsible for living within their own rules-
rules which must be fair and must be fairly implemented. Arbitrary and
capricious acts will remain reviewable by the judiciary.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: DUE PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL
A. Conflict Resolution
The basic purposes of rules within any rule-governed institution are
to establish the guidelines of behavior by which conflict can be avoided
and to provide touchstones of mutual agreement by which conflict can
be resolved. To fulfill these functions, the rules must engender a sense
of legitimacy both in the party asserting the rule and in the party modi-
fying his behavior in compliance therewith. This legitimacy can arise
from three sources: (a) the consent of the governed; (b) the degree to
which the rules are workable so that larger social goals can be pursued;
and (c) the inherent fairness of the rules as they reflect the ability of
group members to trust in equal application which assures protection
of individual interests and protection of interests of the group at large.
Rules tend to be conservative in their overall effect because they
establish regular habits and predictable behavior and remove per-
sonality issues from routine occurrences.
If conflict does erupt within an institution functioning under rules, it
must be resolved before progress can be made. In seeking resolution,
three modes can be pursued. Outside authority, such as the court
system, can impose resolution upon the parties. To the degree that all
concerned have faith in the integrity of the outside authority, success
can be achieved, particularly if the solution somehow harmonizes the
divergent interests involved. For schools and prisons in the 1980s,
court-imposed remedies may be less available than they have been in
the past.12  A second possible mode of resolution has been an
1 See text accompanying notes 85-125 supra. Not all commentators share this
view. It has been noted:
[C]ourts are beginning ... to take a more active interest in micro-level
concerns (ie., issues of classroom practice and management) as the
awareness builds that court decisions and legislation are of little value if
they are never implemented in classrooms. Hence it is likely that class
action suits will have to share dockets with more suits involving specific
students and classroom situations.
Duke, Donmeyer & Farman, Emerging Legal Issues Related to Classroom
Management, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 305, 305 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
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authoritarian one. In this model, one authority figure often imposes
his/her will and thereby solves the problem. This can be a swift and sure
method of providing rule enforcement.' 7 However, the danger is con-
stantly present that such acts may be arbitrary and capricious. In addi-
tion, group members' interests become adverse, and much energy can
be expended in violent reaction'28 or passive-aggressive behavior.'" The
Duke]. Although the authors anticipate an increased role of the judiciary in
school matters in the future, nowhere is it clear whether they refer to federal or
state courts. Since they are writing at Stanford University, one might expect
they are observing California courts which may be at a more interventionist
stage than the current U.S. Supreme Court.
'" It has been suggested that:
There are types of authority which do not have as their sole or even
principal constituent, rationality; Parents, teachers, army commanders,
and above all, prison wardens have the right to depend to a large extent
(though not arbitrarily) upon habit, custom, intuition, common sense not
reduced to express principles, and other forms of judgment based more
on experience than on logic. Life requires in some aspects another
sovereign than reason. To rule is not to opine.
Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 4 (1969), vacated and remanded with directions,
430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
' As Circuit Judge Sobeloff observed:
Experience teaches that nothing so provokes trouble for the manage-
ment of a penal institution as a hopeless feeling among inmates that
they are without opportunity to voice grievances or to obtain redress for
abusive or oppressive treatment. It is common knowledge that many
prison riots have been in protest of abuses in disciplinary cell blocks.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966).
12 "A major conclusion of those who have studied the structural features of
the school organization is that preoccupation with student control permeates the
life of the school." Licata, Student Brinkmanship and School Structure, 42 EDUC.
F. 345, 347 (1978). As a result, students frequently develop a skill called "brink-
manship" which has been defined as "assertive student behavior which attempts
to challenge the school's authority system while avoiding its negative sanctions."
Id. at 345. Licata finds three categories of student brinkmanship: subversive obe-
dience, tight-roping, and boundary testing. He identifies these categories as
follows:
Subversive obedience is rule-obeying behavior in which the student
follows a rule to the letter or in an exaggerated way in order to use the
organization's rules to its own disadvantage. The "class lawyer" is
always ready to insist on strict enforcement of the rules at the most em-
barrassing time for the teacher. The "class clown" is quick to mimic a
robot when the teacher asks him to stand straight. The "mock enforcer"
jumps at the opportunity to repeat a teacher's reproof to a classmate.
Tight-roping is neither rule obeying nor rule disobeying behavior, but
behavior which is difficult to define in terms of specific rules of the
organization. Rule vagueness is used as a means to avoid organizational
sanctions. Student coughing or laughing in an exaggerated manner is
very difficult for the teacher to formally define in terms of specific rule-
breaking. Does he always cough like that, the teacher wonders? Did




effects can be equally destructive to the authority figure; as the proverb
states, "all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely."3 '
The third mode, by far the preferred one, can be found in a self-
regulatory participation of group members in goal-setting and rule-
making. By involvement in the process by which the rules are created,
group members have an opportunity to insure that their interests are
represented and taken into account. Habits of cooperation, compromise
and mutual trust, the ability to cope with ambiguity and implicit
knowledge of what is required, all combine to promote an assumption
that conflicts can and will be fairly resolved. This mode is a valid educa-
tional/rehabilitative tool whereby order is maintained and individual
skills are developed. The effect on the individuals involved is to promote
self-discipline, to reward maturity, and to enable leadership skills to
develop. Responsibility for enforcement is shared by group members
and officials who are now authoritative leaders rather than
authoritarian ones. The distinction is that authoritative denotes posses-
sion of skills and knowledge prized by the group whereas authoritarian
connotes reliance on force and power.
B. The Model Itself
The first component of the model is that there must be written rules
for the institution in question, rules that are generally understood by all
segments of the institution. Although not arrived at by group participa-
tion, the Ten Commandments"' serve as a good historical example of the
importance of written rules. These rules, with their simplicity and their
economy, exemplify the sense of legitimacy'32 requisite in a rule-
governed society through their workability in preventing and resolving
there on purpose? The successful tight-roper is careful not to leave the
teacher enough evidence to answer those questions. After all, there are
probably no rules against coughing, laughing, or harmless accidents.
Boundary testing is rule disobeying behavior disguised in some way
so that organizational sanctions are avoided. The "student banzai" ... is
a boundary-testing act based on the rationale that massive, simultaneous
rule-breaking is very difficult for the organization to control. After all, it
is difficult to punish everybody, and to call attention to such collective
efforts by students may result in loss of face for the teacher.
Id. at 346.
"3 Acton's classic proverb about the corrupting influence of absolute
power is true of prison guards no less than of other men. In fact, prison
guards may be more vulnerable to the corrupting influence of unchecked
authority than most people. It is well known that prisons are operated
on minimum budgets and that poor salaries and working conhitions
make it difficult to attract high calibre personnel. Moreover, the "train-
ing" of the officers in methods of dealing with obstreperous prisoners is
but a euphemism in most states.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 1966).
Exodus 20:3-17.
'3 See Part IV(A) supra.
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conflict over the past several centuries. As they have been applied
throughout history, they have illustrated a reliance upon authoritative
rules, not authoritarian ones; an enforcement based on self-discipline,
not external sanctions; and a universal acceptance, transcending time
and personality. As institutions begin to develop a process by which
new rules can be written and present rules modified, they should keep
in mind that rule-making is an art form which perhaps has reached its
quintessence in the Ten Commandments.
One commentator has observed that the regular, impartial and in this
sense, fair, administration of law may be called "justice as regularity. 133
"It follows that in order to have 'regularity' there must be some
rules-public substantive rules that define rights, powers, duties and
obligations-procedural rules that specify how and when rights, powers,
duties and obligations can be exercised."'"4 This analysis surfaces the
two major components of good rules. First, they must be substantively
fair; a rule must be minimally intrusive upon the liberty, property or
other fundamental interest of the individual, finding its justification in
the compelling needs of the institution. Further, it must not be vague;
the individual must subjectively understand that the contemplated
behavior is of the proscribed type.135 An example of how these substan-
tive requirements would be applied in a school setting is provided by R.
Edmund Reutter in his set of guidelines
for determining the minimum essentials for an enforceable rule
of student behavior.
1. Whether it is issued orally or in writing, school
authorities must take reasonable steps to bring the rule to the
attention of students. A major exception is when the act for
which a student is to be disciplined is obviously destructive of
school property or disruptive of school operation.
2. The rule must have a legitimate educational purpose.
3. The rule must have a rational relationship to the achieve-
ment of the stated educational purpose.
4. The meaning of the rule must be reasonably clear.
5. The rule must be sufficiently narrow in scope that it does
not encompass constitutionally protected activities along with
those that constitutionally may be proscribed in the school set-
ting.
133 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971).
13 Jackson, supra note 15, at 328.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The Court has set
the standard for vagueness as failure "to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden," United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), and as encouraging arbitrary and erratic arrests and con-




6. If the rule infringes a fundamental constitutional right of
students, a compelling interest of the school (state) in the en-
forcement of the rule must be shown. 36
A substitution of the words prison/inmate/rehabilitative for
school/student/educational in the above guidelines will result in stan-
dards readily applicable in the prison context.
The implementation of the substantive component of good rules
begins with the involvement of each segment of the institution in the
rule-making process. This involvement is essential to give the rules that
legitimacy which evolves from setting the goals which the rules are
designed to effectuate. Such a shift from a custodial role to one of active
participation has several benefits which accrue to the individual and,
through his/her development, to the institution as a whole.
Active participation in the rule-making process is essentially training
in acceptance of adult responsibilities. It will involve the individual in
activities which reward his gaining of control over himself and events
around him. It will make the individual responsible for his own growth
and carry with it opportunities for development of self respect. Skills in
communication, problem identification, and creation of alternatives will
increase. Participation will add to the individual's capacity to under-
stand ways in which perceptions and conclusions can differ among in-
dividuals and develop skills in harmonizing interests, dealing with am-
biguity, identifying long term goals, and working cooperatively to
achieve them.1 37 This process may require the reevaluation of rule en-
forcement techniques currently in use in both schools and prisons, in
particular, strip searches '38 and corporal punishment,139 which are by
1 E. REUTTER, THE COURTS AND STUDENT CONDUCT 6 (1975), quoted in Duke,
supra note 126, at 306.
13 Although this list is a compilation by the authors of this article, it was in-
spired by Murton, Shared Decision-Making as a Treatment Technique in Prison
Management, 3 N. ENG. J. PRISON L. 97 (1976) and Roberts, Children Learn Rules
by Helping to Make Them, 54 PARENTS MAGAZINE 84 (Apr. 1979).
138 The destructive nature of strip searches was eloquently expressed by Mr.
Justice Marshall as follows:
In my view, the body cavity searches of MCC inmates represent one
of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and common
decency. After every contact visit with someone from outside the facility,
including defense attorneys, an inmate must remove all of his or her
clothing, bend over, spread the buttocks, and display the anal cavity for
inspection by a correctional officer. Women inmates must assume a
suitable posture for vaginal inspection, while men must raise their
genitals. And, as the Court neglects to note, because of time pressures,
this humiliating spectacle is frequently conducted in the presence of
other inmates.
The District Court found that the stripping was "unpleasant, embar-
rassing, and humiliating." A psychiatrist testified that the practice placed
inmates in the most degrading position possible, a conclusion amply cor-
roborated by the testimony of the inmates themselves. There was
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their nature so degrading as to be inimical to the trust relationship on
which this model rests.
If the substantive rules meet the fairness test, procedural habits will
follow. While not advocating that the formal procedural safeguards
established at higher levels be brought into the daily confrontations be-
tween guard and inmate, teacher and student, the procedures proposed
would require informal, but consistent, responses to confrontation which
rely upon accurate fact-finding, careful documentation and predication
evidence, moreover, that these searches engendered among detainees
fears of sexual assault, were the occasion for actual threats of physical
abuse by guards, and caused some inmates to forego personal visits.
Not surprisingly, the Government asserts a security justification for
such inspections. These searches are necessary it argues, to prevent in-
mates from smuggling contraband into the facility. In crediting this
justification despite the contrary findings of the two courts below, the
Court overlooks the critical facts. As respondents point out, inmates are
required to wear one-piece jumpsuits with zippers in the front. To insert
an object into the vaginal or anal cavity, an inmate would have to
remove the jumpsuit at least from the upper torso. Since contact visits
occur in a glass enclosed room and are continuously monitored by correc-
tions officers, such a feat would seem extra ordinarily difficult. There
was medical testimony, moreover, that inserting an object into the rec-
tum is painful and "would require time and opportunity which is not
available in the visiting areas," and that visual inspection would prob-
ably not detect an object once inserted. Additionally, before entering
the visiting room, visitors and their packages are searched thoroughly
by a metal detector, fluoroscope, and by hand. Correction officers may
require that visitors leave packages or handbags with guards until the
visit is over. Only by blinding itself to the facts presented on this record
can the Court accept the Government's security rationale.
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1893-94 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this
case, the holding on body cavity searches is a 5-4 decision as Justice Powell joins
the dissenters on this issue:
I join the opinion of the Court except the discussion and holding with
respect to body cavity searches. In view of the serious intrusion on one's
privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at least some level of cause,
such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal and
genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue.
Id. at 1886 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). This practice is unfortunately not
limited to the prison setting but is also used by some school administrators. See
M. M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
'" The results of the use of corporal punishment have been previously
documented. See note 5 supra. "The N.E.A. (National Education Association)
thinks it's ironic that physical abuse of school children is legal, while striking
prisoners, military personnel and inmates of institutions is forbidden." Ramella,
The Anatomy of Discipline: Should Punishment Be Corporal?, 67 P.T.A.
MAGAZINE 24, 26 (June 1973). It may well be that although forbidden, corporal
punishment is still used in the prison situation in the context of use of excessive
force in enforcing institutional rules. Assault charges against corrections officers




on reason not emotion. The confrontations that emerge in this model
should be increasingly reflective of the authority shift to the population
generally. Therefore, inmate may confront inmate or student may con-
front student about issues of disruption or disobedience which frustrate
that individual's realization of institutional goals. The roles in the in-
stitution will change as guards and teachers become facilitators and
enablers rather than stark authority figures. Potentially this would
result in a better use of energy and resources within the institution.
This model is both practical and idealistic. It is idealistic in its
reliance upon the theory of openness and participation within society as
it is reflected in the American democracy. It is practical in the sense
that it would reduce costs"4'-both human and financial-by the volun-
tary involvement of individuals within the institution.
Commentators have censured both prisons and schools as failures:
"The ultimate problem, to paraphrase a number of experts, is that a
'prison system is the only business that succeeds by its failure.' Prisons
cannot justify themselves. They are costly and destructive, and they
have not served the purposes for which they were intended. '4
Although approaches utilized within the American penal system during
the last two centuries have varied, there is abundant, irrefutable
evidence that prisons have not achieved success in performing the
rehabilitative function.""
Schools, supposedly preparing students for citizenship in a
democratic society, among other goals, have been said to be "one of the
most undemocratic places in the world."'4 Test scores have been declin-
ing and "the National Assessment has charted a steady decline since
140 The operation of both schools and prisons is costly. It has been suggested
that it costs from $17,000 to $25,000 a year to incarcerate one prisoner. Potts,
Alternative Punishments for Being Poor Won't Reduce Crime: A Proposal for
Non-Correctional Alternatives to Punishment, 2 PRISON L. MONITOR 160, 160
(1979). Entire school systems have suspended operations for inability to meet
payroll. Reduction in the amount of administrative and staff time spent in
disciplinary efforts will result in overall savings inherent in the better use of that
time in furthering educational and rehabilitative goals. Additional saving could
accrue with violence and vandalism reduced.
There is genuine fear on the part of the authors that, in these times of reduced
tax revenue and voter unwillingness to increase investment in schools and
prisons through approval of operating levies, institutions may find themselves at-
tempting to reduce costs by reducing staff or overcrowding the institutional
population. The only foreseeable result of such attempts is an increased emphasis
on institutional needs for security and order which will outbalance individual
claims to due process protections. Arbitrariness will be legitimized if the institu-
tion is forced to function below minimal levels of staffing. Such occurrences are
not constitutionally permissible.
141 Id
"' Murton, supra note 137, at 111.
' Mullins, Neede& A Fair Shake for Children, TODAY'S EDUC. 80, 81
(Nov.-Dec. 1975).
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the early 1970's in knowledge of the U.S. governmental system among
17-year-olds."'" In the face of such failure, the search for new alter-
natives is a justifiable social goal.
Several experiments have already taken place which incorporate in
schools one or more aspects of the model herein proposed. This process
is predicated upon reevaluating the assumptions upon which old institu-
tions were built.
In the prison area, one frequently suggested reform is that of finding
alternatives to incarceration. These may take the form of "social
maintenance programs designed only to assist people in learning to
identify and use existing resources available to them." 4 ' Presently such
programs necessarily are coercive and are provided within a prison set-
ting.
James L. Potts, editor of the Prison Law Monitor, suggests that such
programs are based on two premises: first, he sees street crime as based
on poverty and second, as a result, he views it as a social, not a correc-
tional problem. His proposal focuses on alternatives for the future which
would concentrate on providing poor people who populate prisons
with skills and opportunities which would help them function successfully
in the larger society upon their release. Mainstream people learn these
skills as part of their socialization process. The crucial skills would in-
clude communication skills, goal-setting, and the ability to identify con-
tact persons in the larger community."'
The need for skill-building argues strongly for the inclusion of in-
mates in program planning. Mr. Potts, formerly an inmate himself,
serves as a good example of a person who is now earning a living utiliz-
ing skills acquired in his prison days.
Professor Murton, who views shared decision-making as a treatment
modality... in which the two main variables are representation and
power, argues strongly for increased democratization and increased in-
volvement of inmates in the management of institutions. Murton found
that most prisons which have innovated by the formation of inmate
councils have utilized one of three models, labeled "Token," "Quasi-
Governmental" and "Governmental.""'4 Additionally, Murton developed
an idealized fourth model, which he called "Full Participation." This
model, with an extensive amount of responsibility in decision-making
shared by inmates, staff and administrators of the prison, was deemed
by Murton to be superior; the formation of the structure, duties, and
14 Remy, Basic Citizenship Competencies: Guidelines for Educators Polic-
makers, and Citizens, 5 MERSHON CENTER Q. REP. 1, 1 (1979).
"' Potts, supra note 140, at 161.
" Id





goals of the council is a joint effort, never imposed from the top. '49
Although Professor Murton found no pure examples of this model, he
did identify the work of four prison reformers as including various
basic elements of this Full Participation model. He admits that inmate
council programs have failed up to this point, but he attributes this to
the fact that too little power has been given to the inmates and staff.
More democracy, rather than less, is needed for success.
A highly successful program in shared decision-making was im-
plemented in the Berkshire County (Massachusetts) House of Correction
in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.'5" In this program, a university and a cor-
rectional facility worked together to offer inmates positive oppor-
tunities for growth inside and outside the institution. Where formerly
the jail had been operated in a typically hierarchical fashion, closed from
outside scrutiny and accountability, decision-making became shared, and
increased visibility led to heightened accountability.
The program staff helped the institution develop mechanisms for
more effective policy-making which would involve all members of the
correction community interacting in nontraditional roles. A system of
committees and boards was created including a "Governance Board,"
the objective of which was the development of shared power and shared
decision-making within the jail. ' Although the program left veto power
in the hands of the sheriff, he never utilized that power to frustrate the
will of the majority so far as specific programs were concerned.'1 ' Once
the mechanisms for governance, decision-making and problem-solving
were in place, changes in the roles of the participants occurred."3
The governance board created a disciplinary board in response to a
proposal generated by an inmate study group. The board, which con-
sisted of four corrections officers elected by the inmates, was a response
to the previous practices of disparate charging and sentencing by in-
149 Id at 104-05.
See generally Cohen, Jail Reform: An Experiment That Worked?, 12 CRIM.
L. BULL. 758 (Nov.-Dec. 1976). The program was called the Model Education Pro-
gram [hereinafter referred to as MEP].
11, Id at 765-66.
'5, Id, at 768.
1' Those correctional officers who had come to work simply to "do
time," took a new interest in their own development and in the opera-
tion of the jail. The harshness of the institution was visibly softening
under the impact of former adversaries meeting in settings that re-
quired collaboration. Ideas were being dealt with on the basis of merit
and the persuasiveness of a presentation and not simply on their source.
What was unthinkable prior to MEP-officers and inmates deciding on
how aspects of the jail would be run-became an everyday occurrence.
Process and structure alone, however, would not be sufficient to account
for the high levels of inmate and officer enthusiasm and participation.
Each group could define something in MEP of benefit to them, and if an
individual could not, that individual likely stayed out of the programs.
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dividual officers. It shows how a due process approach has been used to
reduce discretion and arbitrariness, a due process approach conceived of
and implemented by the inmates themselves.' In its final form, this
became a program in which community/prison barriers broke down
significantly. Staff became better trained, inmates gained skills and
jobs, the community came into the prison, and inmates successfully
reentered the community. Above all of these significant improvements
stood the fact that inmates gained even greater power within the in-
stitution. Programs such as these, involving at least segments of our
model, show the feasibility of such an approach.
Schools have also implemented innovative programs which contain
aspects of our model. The Lewiston-Porter Central School in
Youngstown, New York began the system of change through the
establishment of the Lew-Port System Redesign Committee.' This was
a sixty member board on which students sat with equal power as an in-
tegral part of the planning process. This committee was charged with
"the task of assessing the community's educational needs, suggesting
methods of improving the ability of the school district to meet the
needs, developing a mission statement as to district goals and district
general objectives and recommending the approach to these matters to
the board of education."'56 As well as serving on this system-wide com-
mittee, students assumed decision-making roles within individual
schools. An example was the creation of a student-faculty committee
which held regular meetings to provide an open discussion forum with
the dual purposes of opening communication lines and solving minor dif-
ficulties before they grew into major confrontations.'
Another creative use of students in the decision-making process oc-
curred in Staples High School, Westport, Connecticut.'58 In this situa-
'" Id. at 775.
Topics such as the quality of food and hours spent by all inmates in
lockup now are reviewed by the board. A disciplinary board, composed
of four officers elected by the inmates, has been functioning since the fall
of 1975. Previously, individual officers were responsible for disciplinary
matters, and this resulted in disparate charging and sanctioning prac-
tices. The governance board created the disciplinary board in response
to a proposal generated by an inmate study group.
Id
15 Herman, Students'Rights: A Program That Works, THE CLEARING HOUSE
54 (Sept. 1973).
Id. at 54.
"5 Id. at 55. One result of this committee was the creation of written rules.
These rules were formulated as "students' rights and responsibilities" rather
than as a more traditional disciplinary code.
Herman takes a very activist posture: "Students are intelligent, articulate,
service-minded, and positively realistic in their approach to problem solving. In-
volve them." Id. at 58.
158 See generally Calkins, Are Students Involved in Deciding Crucial Issues?,




tion, school administrators, realizing that they had to take prudent but
definite risks, involved young people in crucial areas of the school
decision-making process. Based on a philosophy that schools must be
humane and democratic,' 9 the system put these principles into action.
As a result of this shared power, significant changes occurred in the
policies and practices of the school.6 0
The Staples High School experience began in the early 1970s. It is
worthy of note that although it predates Goss v. Lopez' and the
Freedom of Information Act,' 2 it anticipates the content of both in the
changes it produced. Another school system that shared this view of
students as change agents was the Pike County High School of Brun-
didge, Alabama.'6 3 Here, the school system empowered students to
create a program to solve the drug problem at the high school by involv-
ing them in the power structure of the school. The details of the pro-
"s Calkins observed:
If the school is to be humane and democratic, students should be in-
volved in the decision-making process. If that is not the intent, it really
makes little difference what is done. Unless the students are given their
fair share of power, neither humanization nor democratization is possi-
ble. What exists otherwise is benevolent despotism at the worst, or con-
descending paternalism at best.
Id. at 15.
" The following is a partial list of the significant changes that occurred:
Some of these actions were: elimination of "tracking" in all subjects ...
elimination of all bells ... elimination of homerooms and systematic at-
tendance taking on a daily basis . . . provision of a system of shared
responsibility between the home and school for attendance and progress
... elimination of mandatory study halls.., creation of option areas for
serious and quiet study, talk-study tutorials, smoking, and blowing off
steam . . . opening up the cafeteria as a coffee and doughnut shop for
breakfast and provision for pretzel stands, soda machines, snack
machines . . . provision for a suspension review board of students and
faculty as an initial step in eliminating suspension ... provision of com-
plete freedom of campus and buildings as long as classes and rights of
others were not interfered with ... initiation of an open-ended schedule
for all students which permitted them to come when their first class
began and leave when the last class was over . . . provision for faculty
professional self-evaluation through a program of professional develop-
ment and appraisal ... elimination of prerequisites for participation in
extracurricular activities ... subdivision of courses into a variety of elec-
tive units which students could select to build a year's work ... expan-
sion of opportunities in individualized programs . . . provision for an
uncensored school newspaper ... provision of students' access to their
own records.
Id. at 17-18.
... 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
12 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
16 See generally Wright, Students Can Be Effective Change Agents, 63 NAT'L
A. SECONDARY SCH. PRINCIPALS BULL. 44 (Feb. 1979).
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gram are not important for purposes of this article. What is significant
is that it was successful and that the "changes and actions [were] made
by students and for students."'
V. CONCLUSION
People who have worked in schools and prisons"5 have frequently
been adversely affected by the misuse of energies within these institu-
tions. Each segment of the institutional population possesses skills,
values, and information which could be tapped in order to provide more
creative methods for the institution to use in achieving its goals. Seldom
do programs emerge utilizing these talents.16 People confined in these
institutions have had little say in defining them. Reformers working
within the institutional structure have frequently been not well received,
even to the point of losing their jobs.'67
Another recurring observation, from within and without, is that these
institutions lack control. This lack of control may stem from the failure
of the institutions to articulate clearly their own goals so that, as a
result, daily matters become the central issues of their operation. Once
mundane matters become central, the client population responds with
creative means of violating the rules, which forces the institution to re-
spond with greater measures of control."8 The strip search enters the
school; some prisoners spend their entire term in solitary confinement.'
The ultimate result of this concern with control is the alienation of both
16 Id at 46 (emphasis in original).
165 The authors of this article have drawn heavily upon their own experiences
in such institutions. After several years as public school teachers, they have been
active recently in designing curricula used in the instruction of inmates, correc-
tions officers, and police officers. They have provided instruction in the prison
setting and worked with corrections officers in creating rules responsive to due
process mandates.
'" For exceptions to this statement, see the programs discussed in Part IV(B)
supra.
167 Murton discussed the consequences of the efforts of four prison wardens to
implement innovative reforms in these terms: "Perhaps the only disadvantage of
their innovations was to the wardens themselves, for each man suffered personally
for his efforts. Revolutionary attempts to overthrow oppression and to inculcate
honesty and genuine concern were rewarded in all cases, with the professional
demise of the reformer." Murton, supra note 137, at 105.
16 A typical response is the following:
When student behavior problems have perplexed educators in the past,
they typically have responded by creating more rules or making
punishments for breaking existing rules more harsh. These standard ap-
proaches have not been very effective. A recent study of California
alternative high schools suggests, in fact, that fewer rules may be
associated with reduced behavior problems. Where relatively few rules
exist, they may tend to be taken more seriously by students and
teachers.
Duke, supra note 126, at 306. We would suggest that the remedy of reducing the




staff and population.'69 In addition, society is dismayed both at the rule-
breaking behavior, such as violence and vandalism, and at the institu-
tions' failure to prepare their populations to productively reenter the
larger society.
The model herein proposed with its emphasis on written rules is ac-
tually an extension of self-government within the institution and account-
ability of the institution to the larger society. Due process concerns of
fairness create a self-perpetuating cycle: the content of the rules must
be fair and reflective of group goals; in addition procedural rules enforc-
ing or implementing substantive rules must be fair; procedures must be
established to provide opportunities for change in the goals; change in
goals must be reflected in amended substantive rules; and so the pro-
cess continues.
At each point, supervision is necessary. This supervision within the
institution is provided by all segments of the population as they super-
vise each other with built-in mechanisms of checks and balances. Exter-
nally, society at large is able to examine the written rules and is obligated
to ascertain that these are the rules under which the institution actually
operates. Through school and prison inspections by boards or agencies
created for this purpose, this monitoring function can be effectuated.
Courts can assist when necessary through their supervisory powers.
Throughout this article, the authors have examined the impact of
various United States Supreme Court decisions upon these institutions.
Although the Court seems now to be removing itself from intervention
in areas which it views as administrative, it leaves in place due process
protections for students and inmates. The challenge of the 1980s to the
institutions is to make these rules an organic part of institutional
growth. In the process, skills of documentation, fact-finding, goal-setting
and rule-making will lead the institutions to a healthy exploration of
alternative management styles. Shared decision-making as a guarantee
of fundamental fairness is crucial to the evolution of a successful
management method.
169 An example of the alienating effect of solitary confinement is found in J.
Anthony Kline's remark that "while some prisoners must be isolated, only five
percent of the men who go into the Hole for the first time have any previous
history of violence or assault. However .... if you put a man in the Hole for any
length of time, he becomes violent. He becomes an animal." The Hole, THE NA-
TION 582 (Dec. 7, 1974). Mr. Kline was the chief attorney in a suit against Ray-
mond K. Procunier, California's Director of Corrections, challenging punishment
by confinement in the Hole. The challenge was unsuccessful.
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PENSION/EXPUL- X X X X X X X
SION LEVEL
EMERGENCY RE-
MOVAL PRO- X x X X X X X x
CEDURE
EXPULSION AP-




INTENDENT WITH X X X X X X X X X
DUE PROCESS
APPEALS PRO-
CEDURE FOR SUS- X x X X X X x x x
PENSION
SUSPENSION PRO-




















Record Kept Hearing Hearing Hearing
SUMMARY PUNISHMENT Without Without
Record Kept Hearing Hearing X
INMATES RECEIVE
NOTICE OF RULES X X X X
AND RIGHTS
APPEAL PROCEDURE X None Listed X
CONFINED TO CELL
OR DARKER CELL X
Not > 1 Week
SOLITARY CONFINE-
MENT Not > 48 Hours X
SHERIFF DETERMINES X
PROCEDURAL DUE
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